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I. Introduction
This Article considers judicial approaches to the adjudication of
the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)1

† Associate Professor, Director, Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Co-Director,
LLM in Human Rights Programme, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong. I am
grateful to Holning Lau for his helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Elizabeth Lui
and Lili Ullmann for their assistance.
1
Some have critiqued the LGBT acronym as overly narrow since it may not account
for cultural variabilities and not all sexual orientation or gender identity minorities
necessarily identify as LGBT. See Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Discrimination, 2 COMP. DISCRIMINATION L. 1, 4 (2018). For the sake of convention and
consistency, however, this Article uses “LGBT” throughout and sometimes “sexual
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persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong). Hong Kong provides a
notable case study of litigation strategies and court responses in a
jurisdiction open to international human rights law. Sodomy was
decriminalized in 1991 under the former British colonial regime,
and, since 2006, Hong Kong courts have decided a number of cases
concerning a range of issues including transgender marriage,2
different ages of consent for vaginal and anal intercourse,3 other
discriminatory criminal provisions,4 restrictions on television
broadcasts about relationships between gay men,5 the rights of
incarcerated transgender persons,6 and the rights of same-sex
couples.7 Other cases are still working their way through the system
and future challenges are anticipated as advocates continue to
pursue a persistent litigation strategy.8
orientation” and “gender identity” when referring to particular protected characteristics or
prohibited grounds of discrimination.
2 See W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); W
v. Registrar of Marriages, [2012] H.K.C. 88 (C.A.) (H.K.); W v. Registrar of Marriages,
[2010] 6 HKC 359 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
3 See Leung v. Sec’y for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.) (H.K.); Leung v.
Sec’y of Justice, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 657 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
4 See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung & Lee Kam Chuen,
[2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 196 (C.A.) (H.K.).
5 See Cho Man Kit v. Broad. Auth., [2008] H.K.E.C. 783 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
6 See Navarro Luigi Recasa v. Comm’r of Correctional Services, [2018] 4
H.K.L.R.D. 38 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
7 See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324 (C.F.A.) (H.K.);
Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2018] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 84 (C.A.) (H.K.).
The Court of Final Appeal is expected to consider the last two issues concerning civil
service spousal benefits and joint tax filing on appeal in 2019.
8 See MK v. Government of the HKSAR [2019] H.K.C.U. 53 (C.F.I.); See e.g.,
Raquel Calvarho, Three Transgender Men Challenge Hong Kong Policy Requiring Full
Sex Change before They are Legally Considered Male, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan.
9, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/community/article/2127525/threetransgender-men-challenge-hong-kong-policy-requiring [https://perma.cc/54DV-9T3Q];
Chris Lau, Two Gay Men Mount First Legal Challenges to Hong Kong Laws Banning
Same-sex Marriage, with Court Giving Their Applications Green Light to Proceed, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-andcrime/article/2180551/two-gay-men-mount-first-legal-challenges-hong-kong-laws
[https://perma.cc/5FN8-WXA4]; Chris Lau & Kimmy Chung, Woman Takes
Unprecedented Step to Advance LGBT Cause in Hong Kong and Sues Government over
Civil Partnerships Ban, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 24, 2018),
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With some exceptions, in most of these decisions the courts
have at least partially dismantled discriminatory policies. At the
same time, however, government and legislative efforts have lagged
behind.9 For example, although international human rights bodies
have regularly called on the Hong Kong authorities to introduce
anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of sexual orientation
and gender identity, the government has thus far resisted.10 The
limited policy changes that have occurred have been in direct
response to judicial review, and even then there have been delays
on certain issues.11
Based on a study of these judgments, read in the context of
developments in international human rights law, this Article
considers prospects for upcoming challenges to the lack of access
for same-sex couples to legal recognition in the form of same-sex
marriage or civil partnerships. Several factors could influence the
trajectory of these cases and LGBT rights in Hong Kong generally.
First, local public opinion has shifted toward greater acceptance of
LGBT rights in recent years,12 possibly due to rapidly evolving

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/community/article/2161287/woman-takesunprecedented-step-advance-lgbt-cause-hong-kong [https://perma.cc/Y7GX-YKWZ].
9 See Carole J. Petersen & Kelley Loper, Equal Opportunities Law Reform in Hong
Kong: The Impact of International Norms and Civil Society Advocacy, in REFORMING LAW
REFORM: PERSPECTIVES FROM HONG KONG AND BEYOND (Michael Tilbury et al. eds.,
2014). Amy Barrow and Joy Chia observe that “[g]iven the inhospitable legislative
context, strategic litigation has proven to be the primary vehicle for legal reforms crucial
to the advancement of LGBT rights.” See Amy Barrow & Joy L. Chia, Pride or Prejudice:
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Religion in Post-Colonial Hong Kong, 46 H.K.
L.J. 89 (2016).
10 See, e.g., Concluding observations of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao), ¶ 78,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.107 (May 13, 2005).
11
In response to the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in W v Registrar of
Marriages, which recognized the right of a post-operative transgender woman to marry
in her acquired gender, the government established an Inter-departmental Working
Group on Gender Recognition (IWG) in January 2014 “to consider whether it is
necessary to introduce legislation and incidental administrative measures to deal with
issues concerning gender recognition in Hong Kong.” See Home, INTER-DEPARTMENTAL
WORKING GROUP ON GENDER RECOGNITION, https://iwggr.gov.hk/eng/index.html
[https://perma.cc/LH77-LEDA]. Since then, the IWG has completed a comparative study
and conducted a public consultation in 2017, but it has not yet produced a report or made
any publicly available recommendations to the government.
12 See Lau, supra note 1; see also Holning Lau, Charles Lau, Kelley Loper, & Yiutung Suen, Support in Hong Kong for Same-sex Couples’ Rights Grew Over Four Years
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global trends. Studies indicate that rights-friendly law reform, such
as recognition of same-sex marriage, is more likely to occur in
societies with more tolerant attitudes.13
Developments in international human rights law in this area
could also generate further momentum.14 In Hong Kong, with its
relatively open society and common law legal system that relies on
precedent and permits the courts to cite comparative authority,15
international legal innovations should continue to shape the
outcomes of future cases. The judiciary’s proclivity to rely on, and
be persuaded by, international human rights law suggests prospects

(2013-2017): Over Half of People in Hong Kong Now Support Same-Sex Marriage, in
BRIEFING PAPER, CENTRE FOR COMPARATIVE AND PUBLIC LAW, UNIVERSITY OF HONG
KONG FACULTY OF LAW; UNC LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER (2018); Kelley Loper,
Holning Lau, Charles Lau, Yiu-tung Suen, Public Attitudes Towards Transgender People
and Anti-Discriminatory Legislation, CTR. FOR COMP. AND PUB. L., (December 2017,
revised June 2018).
13 See generally Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Backgrounder on Same-Sex
Marriage Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/same-sex-marriage-global-comparisons
[https://perma.cc/CS7C-ZQSW]; ENZE HAN & JOSEPH O’MAHONEY, BRITISH
COLONIALISM AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY: QUEENS, CRIME AND
EMPIRE 82–86 (1st ed., 2018) (explaining, in their study of the criminalization of
homosexuality in former British colonies, that factors influencing decriminalization have
included openness to the outside world, access to information about global trends, and
acceptance of international human rights norms. They also point out that decriminalization
of same-sex conduct in Hong Kong was influenced by the introduction of the Bill of Rights
Ordinance in 1991 in response to public concerns about the future protection of human
rights in the run up to the territory’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997).
14 See Carole J. Petersen, International Law and the Rights of Gay Men in Former
British Colonies: Comparing Hong Kong and Singapore, 46 H.K. L.J. 109, 109–29 (2016);
Carole J. Petersen, Values in Transition: The Development of the Gay and Lesbian Rights
Movement in Hong Kong, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 337 (1997); Carole J. Petersen,
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the Strategic Use of
Human Rights Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 28, 28–83 (2013); Barrow & Chia, supra note 9; Joy L. Chia & Amy Barrow,
Inching towards Equality: LGBT Rights and the Limitations of Law in Hong Kong, 22 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 303 (2016); Phil C. W. Chan, The Lack of Sexual Orientation and
Anti-discrimination Legislation in Hong Kong: Breach of International and Domestic
Legal Obligations, 9 THE INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 199, 199–208 (2005).
15 XIANGGANG JIBENFA art. 84 (H.K.) [Hong Kong Basic Law] (promulgated by
Order No. 26, Pres. of China, Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997) [hereinafter Basic
Law] (although the Basic Law is a national law enacted by the National People's Congress
of the People’s Republic of China, it has the status of superior law in Hong Kong and is
considered Hong Kong’s constitutional instrument).
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for progressive responses to issues such as gender recognition, civil
unions, and/or same-sex marriage. International and comparative
human rights law has had a significant influence on the Hong Kong
courts’ adjudication of constitutional rights generally16 and LGBT
issues specifically. The domestic incorporation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)17 has reinforced
judges’ tendency to draw on international and comparative human
rights jurisprudence for guidance.18 In addition to comparative
domestic cases, courts have cited interpretive materials produced by
human rights treaty monitoring bodies, such as the United Nations
(UN) Human Rights Committee19 and judgments rendered by
regional judicial organs, mainly the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR).20
Another key factor is how the courts continue to elaborate an
emerging substantive equality doctrine. This doctrine is grounded
16 See, e.g., Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in Developing the
Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 37 H.K. L.J. 299
(2007); Albert H.Y. Chen, International Human Rights Law and Domestic Constitutional
Law: Internationalisation of Constitutional Law in Hong Kong, 4 NTU L. REV. 237
(2009); Simon N. M. Young, Constitutional Rights in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal,
27 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 67, 81–82 (2011); David S. Law, Judicial
Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2015).
17 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(1), adopted Dec.
19, 1966, U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
18 See Young, supra note 16 (noting that from 1997-2007, 75% of all of the Court of
Final Appeal’s citations to case authorities in rights cases were to non-Hong Kong cases,
48% were decisions made by U.K. courts, and 8% were citations to decisions of
international courts and tribunals. Young observes that the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights was especially influential and most of the U.K. case authorities
involved the 1998 Human Rights Act which incorporates the European Convention on
Human Rights into British law).
19 The independent, expert body tasked with monitoring states’ implementation of
the ICCPR. Hong Kong is party to seven core U.N. Human Rights instruments including
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, the
Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Each of these treaties has its own monitoring body that
reviews states parties’ periodic reports, makes recommendations in concluding
observations, and issues other interpretive materials including general comments and
views (jurisprudence) on individual communications.
20 Petersen, supra note 14, at 48–50.
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in international norms which mandate attention to real disadvantage
and remedies for discriminatory impact.21 In contrast to formal de
jure “equality before the law,” substantive equality takes context
into account and requires states to identify and eliminate laws,
policies, and practices that have de facto discriminatory effects.22 I
argue that the right to equality and non-discrimination, when
understood in this substantive sense, has particular relevance for
furthering LGBT rights. This is especially true in jurisdictions
where formal distinctions in law based on sexual orientation—such
as anti-sodomy provisions—have been removed and constitutional
issues now primarily involve relationship and family rights. Much
of the discrimination facing LGBT persons in these environments is
less direct and more multidimensional, often intersecting with
marital status, gender, and other aspects of identity. It also involves
stigma, prejudicial attitudes, and structures that may require
transformative, positive measures.
The jurisprudence examined in this Article illustrates how these
factors are playing out in Hong Kong as the courts prepare to
consider one of the first same-sex marriage cases in Asia.23 Hong
Kong’s constitutional equality doctrine has developed
predominantly, though not exclusively, in the course of LGBT
rights adjudication and reflects interpretations by international
human rights authorities. As such, the Hong Kong experience
serves as an instructive example of the potential of global human
rights norms, chiefly the right to equality, to advance LGBT claims
in the domestic sphere. It could have comparative value for other
jurisdictions where courts also participate in and are influenced by
a growing global judicial conversation and consensus on LGBTrelated norms.
To set the stage for subsequent analysis of the salience of the
right to equality, Part II summarizes the international legal position
on other rights that have applied to LGBT claims. International law
has increasingly elaborated the relevance of core global and

21 See BEVERLEY BAINES & RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE GENDER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 13–14 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Martin eds.,
2004).
22 See Jennifer Hainfurther, A Rights-Based Approach: Using CEDAW to Protect the
Human Rights of Migrant Workers, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 843, 862 (2009).
23
See Lau, supra note 8. In May 2017, the Taiwan Constitutional Court ruled that
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry in Taiwan.
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regional human rights instruments, despite the absence of explicit
references to sexual orientation or gender identity. Part III then
examines the content of the right to substantive equality and nondiscrimination. It draws in part on interpretive materials produced
by human rights treaty monitoring bodies to clarify the elements of
a substantive equality theory and the legal tools that might be
helpful to achieving its aims. While these materials are not strictly
speaking binding on states, they are regarded as highly persuasive.
Part IV provides a brief overview of Hong Kong’s constitutional
framework and the significance of international human rights law.
It then identifies features of a budding substantive equality doctrine
in Hong Kong. In line with the approach of the international bodies
discussed in Parts II and III, Hong Kong courts have recognized
sexual orientation as a particularly invidious ground of
discrimination. They have also employed a strict proportionality
test when determining the validity of justifications for distinctions
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. They have also
accepted that fulfillment of the right to equality does not necessarily
require equal treatment and, in fact, may sometimes necessitate
differential treatment. This insight, along with its corollary that
facially neutral measures can in some circumstances amount to
unconstitutional
discrimination,
opens
up
possibilities.
Furthermore, the courts have acknowledged a concept of dignity
that they could build on to address the harms that LGBT persons
frequently experience, thus strengthening equality’s concern with
impact.
Part V then considers the implications of this analysis of
substantive equality for resolving LGBT rights issues going
forward. The focus is on relationship rights, especially prospects
for recognition of same-sex marriage and/or civil partnerships in
upcoming challenges.24 At the same time, it reflects on the
likelihood that certain international bodies— which have produced
reasoning the Hong Kong courts have found persuasive—could
revisit their current positions on same-sex marriage. A reading of
the same-sex marriage opinions of the ECHR and the Human Rights
Committee reveals an inadequate grasp of the capacity of
substantive equality. In contrast, in a 2017 advisory opinion, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) embraced
24

See Lau, supra note 8.
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substantive equality in support of same-sex marriage.25 The
untapped potential of other international human rights enforcement
mechanisms, however, coupled with innovations in the ECHR
jurisprudence, suggests strategies for progressing LGBT rights in
Hong Kong and beyond.
II. LGBT Rights in International Law
The following provides a brief summary of the international
legal position on the rights of LGBT persons as interpreted by
global and regional human rights monitoring bodies and judicial
organs.26 This area of jurisprudence is advancing rapidly as these
institutions and domestic courts are asked to resolve questions about
the extent and nature of LGBT rights. As Langford points out, the
numbers of LGBT rights cases brought before international bodies
has grown considerably since the early 1990s and even more rapidly
since 2010.27 At the same time, claimants’ rate of success has also
increased.28
By definition, human rights must be guaranteed to everyone
regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, simply by virtue
of being human.29 None of the general or specialized global or
regional human rights instruments,30 however, explicitly mention
these markers of identity. Various enforcement bodies, such as the

25

State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights
Derived from a Relationship between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in relation to Article 1, of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17].
26 This overview considers only a sample of issues. It is not intended to be a complete
account of relevant international norms which is beyond the scope of this Article.
27 See Malcolm Langford, Same-Sex Marriage in Polarized Times: Revisiting Joslin
v. New Zealand (HRC), in INTEGRATED HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE 119, 122 (Eva Brems
and Ellen Desmet eds., 2017).
28 Id. (noting that “[t]he data is based on our Sexual and Reproductive Rights
Lawfare Database.”).
29 See, e.g., What are Human Rights?, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3ZK9-YKPF].
30 These include the general and specialized core United Nations (U.N.) human rights
treaties and regional instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights, see
infra note 37, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights.
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ECHR, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the IACHR, have
nevertheless clarified that international human rights standards
apply in the LGBT context. They have elaborated on state
obligations and associated violations such as the criminalization of
homosexual sex, denial of family and relationship rights to samesex couples, discrimination in access to economic, social and
cultural rights, and the failure to recognize a change of gender. Soft
law documents, like the Yogyakarta Principles,31 have also been
influential and cited by regional and domestic courts.32 Especially
helpful provisions when addressing the types of harm frequently
affecting LGBT people include: the rights to be free from torture,
other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and arbitrary
deprivation of life; the rights to freedom of expression and
association; and the rights to privacy, family life, and marriage.
Given the wide range of issues and space constraints, this summary
is not exhaustive. It contemplates, however, a sampling of these
norms in order to provide a point of comparison for the subsequent
examination of the significance of the right to equality and nondiscrimination.
The Committee against Torture, the monitoring body for the
Convention against Torture and other forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
31 See The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 7 (2007),
available
at
http://
www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/569U-LJRA]
[hereinafter Yogyakarta Principles]; see also The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10:
Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International Human
rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex
Characteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles, (2007), available
at http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P34Q-8KA8] [hereinafter Yogyakarta Plus 10].
For a discussion of these principles and their significance, see, e.g., Michael
O’Flaherty and John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human
Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS L. REV. 207 (2008);
see also David Brown, Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in
International Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles, 31 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 821 (2010); See generally Andrew Park, Yogyakarta Plus 10: A Demand for
Recognition of SOGIESC, 44 N.C. J. OF INT’L L. 223 (2019) (discussing the creation and
subsequent impact of the Yogyakarta Principles).
32 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 25; see also Naz Found. v. Gov’t
of N.C.T. of Delhi, WP(C) No.7455/2001, Del. H.C. (India).

282

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, has expressed concerns about
the ill-treatment of persons based on their sexual orientation or
gender identity.33 The ECHR has also decided related cases.34 The
Committee against Torture has explained that Article 3 of the
Convention requires states to refrain from expelling or returning
individuals to countries where substantial grounds exist for
believing they would be in danger of torture because of their sexual
orientation.35 The Human Rights Committee and the ECHR have
taken similar positions when interpreting an implicit duty of nonrefoulement (non-return) in Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR36 and

33 For example, in its concluding comments on Iraq’s state report, the Committee
expressed concern “at reliable reports of attacks, some of which have resulted in deaths,
against individuals perpetrated on grounds of their real or perceived sexual orientation or
gender identity.” Comm. Against Torture [CAT], Concluding Observations of the Comm.
Against Torture: Seeking Accountability and Demanding Change: A Report on Women’s
Rights Violations in Iraq, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015).
34 See, e.g., M.C. and C.A. v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (deciding that the
inadequate investigation of violent attacks on participants in a gay pride parade, was a
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights). See also Identoba
and Others v. Georgia, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. 17 (2015).
35 Article 3(1) provides that “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S 85.
In its views on several individual communications, the Committee Against Torture
has held that States violated article 3 for denying asylum to LGBT persons at risk of torture
because of their sexual orientation if returned to their counties of origin. See, e.g., Stewart
v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm., 58th Sess., No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996); see also Comm. Against Torture [CAT], 62nd Sess.,
General Comment No.4 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the
Context of Article 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/4 (2018).
36 See Human Rights Comm. [HRC], 2187th Sess., General Comment No. 31: The
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May. 26, 2004) (“States parties must not extradite,
deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by
articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.”). See also M.I. v Sweden, Human Rights Comm., 108th
Sess., No. 2149/2012, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2149/2012 (2013). See generally M.K.H.
v Denmark, Views, Human Rights Comm., 117th Sess., No. 2462/2014, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/117/D/2462/2014 (2016) (involving a claim by an asylum seeker from
Bangladesh who feared torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if
returned to Bangladesh).
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Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.37 With
regard to transgender rights, the Committee Against Torture has
suggested that requiring a transgender person to undergo surgery or
forced sterilization before obtaining legal recognition of their
acquired gender could amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.38
The rights to be free from torture, inhumane treatment and
arbitrary deprivation of life, however, only apply to particularly
egregious violations, and the threshold for determining what
constitutes such conduct is substantial.39 Although states cannot
derogate from these obligations40 and the prohibition against torture
is absolute, these norms have limited capacity to address many of
the other harms experienced by LGBT persons.
37

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950. 213 U.N.T.S. 222. See, e.g., I.K. v. Switzerland (no. 21417/17); M.E. v. Sweden
(no. 71398/12).
38 See CAT, 1368th Sess., Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of
China with respect to Hong Kong, China, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5 (Feb. 2,
2016). In its concluding observations the Convention against Torture expressed concern
“about reports that transgender persons are required to have completed sex-reassignment
surgery, which includes the removal of reproductive organs, sterilization and genital
reconstruction, in order to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity” and
recommended that Hong Kong “[t]ake the necessary legislative, administrative and other
measures to guarantee respect for the autonomy and physical and psychological integrity
of transgender and intersex persons, including by removing abusive preconditions for the
legal recognition of the gender identity of transgender persons, such as sterilization.” See
generally HOLNING LAU, GENDER RECOGNITION AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Nov. 28, 2018)
(forthcoming chapter for The Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition,
Novelty, Rhetoric) (discussing the right to bodily integrity—sometimes derived from the
right to privacy and from the right to be free from torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment—as one basis for a right to gender recognition).
39 See Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 33 (2002) (“As regards the types
of ‘treatment’ which fall within the scope of article 3 of the Convention, the court’s case
law refers to ‘ill-treatment’ that attains a minimum level of severity and involves actual
bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. Where treatment humiliates or
debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human
dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an
individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterized as degrading and also
fall within the prohibition of article 3. The suffering which flows from naturally occurring
illness, physical or mental, may be covered by article 3, where it is, or risks being,
exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or
other measures, for which the authorities can be held responsible.”).
40 See HRC, 1950th Sess., General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during
a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
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The rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly have
also been invoked. For example, the Human Rights Committee held
that the Russian Federation’s denial of a human rights activist’s
applications to organize gay pride parades and picket in front of the
Iranian Embassy in Moscow to protest against Iran’s execution of
homosexuals violated Article 21 of the ICCPR.41 In another case,
the Committee found that the Russian Federation contravened an
activist’s right to freedom of expression, along with her right to
equality and nondiscrimination, when she was arrested for
displaying signs that read “Homosexuality is normal” and “I am
proud of my homosexuality” near a secondary school.42 The ECHR
similarly decided that laws prohibiting the promotion of
homosexuality violated the right to freedom of expression in
conjunction with the right to non-discrimination.43
The rights to privacy and family life in Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights44 and Article 17 of the ICCPR45 have,

41 Alekseev v. Russian Federation, Views, Human Rights Comm., 109th Sess., No.
1873/2009, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009 (Dec. 2, 2013).
42 Fedotova v. Russian Federation, Views, Human Rights Comm., 106th Sess., No.
1932/2010, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (Nov. 30, 2012) (finding a violation of
Article 19, freedom of expression, in conjunction with Article 26, equality and nondiscrimination).
43 Bayev and Others v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2017) (holding that the laws
incompatible with the values of a democratic society, discriminatory, served no public
interest, and reinforced stigma and prejudice); see Kaos GL v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2016); but see Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (holding that a ban
the distribution of leaflets which are offensive to homosexuals to a secondary school is an
appropriate limit on the right to freedom of expression); see, e.g., Ljubjana v. Slovenia,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014) (allowing a greater scope for expression that might be offensive).
44 Article 8 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 22.
45 ICCPR Article 17 provides:
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
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either on their own or in conjunction with equality and nondiscrimination, played a particularly important role. The right to
privacy has formed the basis of successful challenges to the
criminalization of consensual same-sex relations;46 the discharge
from the Royal Air Force based on homosexuality;47 different ages
of consent for same-sex relations;48 lack of parental rights49 and
permission to adopt a child;50 and denial of relationship rights such
as succession to the tenancy51 and pension52 of a deceased partner.
The failure to provide civil unions or other forms of registered
partnerships has also, more recently, engaged the right to family
life.53 The acceptance of same-sex relationships within the notion
of “family life” in these later cases is significant and allows the
Court to address rights that arguably fall more squarely within
public life and are not limited to the private sphere. The rights to
privacy and family life have also supported the recognition of

reputation.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
ICCPR, supra note 17. For an interpretation of this provision see, HRC, 32nd Sess.,
General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy,
Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 8, 1988).
46 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (ser. B) (1982); Norris v.
Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993);
see generally Toonen v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 50th Sess., No.
488/1992, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/WG/44/D/488/1992 (1994) [hereinafter Toonen v.
Australia] (holding that criminal provisions in Tasmania violated both the right to privacy
and the right to equality and non-discrimination).
47 See Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999).
48 See L. and V. v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 39392/98, 39829/98 (2003).
49 See Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No.33290/96 (1999).
50 Fretté v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 36515/97 (2002); see also E.B. v. France,
Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 43546/02 (2008).
51 See Karner v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 40016/98 (2003).
52 See Young v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., No. 941/2000,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Sept. 18, 2003); see also X v. Colombia, Views,
Human Rights Comm., 89th Sess., No. 1361/2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005
(Mar. 30, 2007).
53 See Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 29381/09,
32684/09 (2013); see also Oliari and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 18766/11,
36030/11 (2015).
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gender identity54 and other related claims.55
While the issue of same-sex marriage remains controversial,
there have been signs of evolution. The IACHR has been
particularly progressive and, at the time of writing, is the only
international human rights enforcement body that has
acknowledged a right to same-sex marriage.56 Notably the IACHR
opinion was based on an expansive interpretation of the rights to
family life in Articles 11(2)57 and 17(1)58 of the American
54
See Lau, supra note 38; Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No.
28957/95 (2002) (holding that the right of a transgender woman to marry in her acquired
gender based on the right to privacy and the right to marriage). Goodwin did not challenge
the lack of same-sex marriage in the United Kingdom at that time.
In Hong Kong a post-operative transgender woman also successfully challenged a
policy that did not recognize her status as a woman for the purposes of marriage. See W v.
Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). The Court of Final
Appeal favorably cited Goodwin when reaching this decision. See e.g., id. at ¶ 76.
55
G v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 119th Sess., No. 217/2012, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2172/2012 (June 15, 2017) [hereinafter G v. Australia] (holding that
Australia’s denial of a transgender woman’s request to change her birth certificate unless
she got divorced was an arbitrary interference in the enjoyment of her privacy and family
rights).
In relation to the right to privacy, the Committee also noted that jurisprudence on
“‘privacy’ under article 17 ‘refers to the sphere of a person’s life in which he or she can
freely express his or her identity, be it by entering into relationships with others or alone.’”
The Committee explained that “its established jurisprudence” clarifies “that this includes
protection of a person’s identity, such as their gender identity.” Id.; but see Hämäläinen v.
Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37359/09 (2014). Hämäläinen v. Finland is discussed in
more detail in Part III below.
56 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 25.
57 Article 11 sets out the right to privacy. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that: “No one
may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his
home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” American
Convention on Human Rights art. 11, “Pact of San Jose,” Organization of American States
(OAS), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
58 Article 17 sets out the rights of the family: Sub-paragraph 1 provides that: “[t]he
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the state.” Id. at art. 17.
In its Advisory Opinion, the Court explained:
Regarding Article 17(2) of the Convention [which sets out the right to marry and
raise a family], the Court considers that although it is true that, taken literally, it
recognizes the ‘right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise
a family,’ this wording does not propose a restrictive definition of how marriage
should be understood or how a family should be based. In the opinion of this Court,
Article 17(2) is merely establishing, expressly, the treaty-based protection of a
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Convention on Human Rights and a substantive reading of the right
to equality and non-discrimination.59 Although the ECHR and the
Human Rights Committee have so far upheld states’ lack of samesex marriage, they have also introduced innovations and left the
door open for a possible reconsideration especially in light of global
trends.60
While all of these norms, either on their own or in combination,
have served to progress LGBT rights, their specificity may limit
their capacity to address a broader range of claims. As considered
in Part III, equality and non-discrimination has a more extensive
reach. As both a principle and a right, it cuts across other treaty
provisions and can support a more comprehensive framework for
remedying the harms often experienced by LGBT persons.
III. The Salience of the Right to Equality
In some cases that arguably involve discriminatory treatment on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, international and
domestic courts have nevertheless failed to employ a right to
equality and non-discrimination. Other times, although invoking
equality, they have applied an overly formal discrimination analysis
and missed an opportunity to further develop a substantive equality
doctrine. This limits the potential of human rights law to tackle a
fuller array of rights violations which LGBT persons commonly
confront and which frequently involve discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, or a combination of
characteristics. Better actualization of rights requires a more
comprehensive assessment of correlated discriminatory effects
beyond formal classifications.
This can also enhance the
precedential value of cases decided on the basis of equality and nondiscrimination. For example, Lau observes that striking down laws
that criminalize homosexual conduct on the basis of discrimination
specific model of marriage. In the Court’s opinion, this wording does not
necessarily mean either than this is the only form of family protected by the
American Convention.
See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 182.
59 “States must ensure full access to all the mechanisms that exist in their domestic
laws, including the right to marriage, to ensure the protection of the rights of families
formed by same-sex couples, without discrimination in relation to those that are formed
by heterosexual couples.” Id. at ¶ 218.
60
See infra Part V.
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“affirms a nondiscrimination principle that can shape subsequent
cases” including those “concerning issues such as partnership and
marriage rights.”61 Basing such a decision on privacy grounds,
however, “may not have the same downstream effects.”62
In order to circumvent any dangers arising from a formal
methodology, however, such an equality principle must be
substantive. As Fredman remarks, the United States Supreme Court
refrained from an equality analysis when ruling that anti-sodomy
laws in Texas were unconstitutional to avoid a possible “leveling
down” solution.63 Indeed, formal equal treatment could still allow
prohibitions of conduct (i.e. sodomy) by both different-sex and
same-sex partners.64 Substantive equality, however, demands
remedies that would dismantle such laws and ensure consistency
with human dignity.
Bearing this in mind, this discussion examines the content of the
right to equality and non-discrimination in international law and
explains its implications for the advancement of LGBT rights. It
notes that substantive equality, according to interpretations by UN
human rights treaty bodies, requires a number of legal tools that can
assist in ameliorating de facto disadvantage. For example, an
expansive approach to the prohibited grounds of discrimination that
is non-exhaustive and includes intersectional realities can more
accurately reflect the complexity of identity. An equality doctrine
must prohibit indirect as well as direct discrimination including
measures that have a discriminatory effect even without intent.
Courts should also recognize that differential treatment and
discrimination are not necessarily the same thing; in other words,
special measures may be consistent with equality while seemingly
neutral policies may in fact discriminate. Therefore, a robust
evaluation of the legitimacy of differences is essential. Dignity is
also an important principle for diagnosing the consequences of
stigma and prejudice and is therefore a key component of
substantive equality in international law. The following focuses on
the legal position in global (UN) human rights law because of the
61

Lau, supra note 1, at 41.
Id.
63
SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 10 (2011) (citing Justice Kennedy’s
language in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)).
64
Id.
62
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special status of the ICCPR in Hong Kong constitutional law65 and
the applicability of other international human rights treaties.66 The
treaty-monitoring bodies for several instruments have, over time,
clarified the meaning of substantive equality.
Nearly all of the global and regional human rights treaties
express a right to equality and non-discrimination. The two general
UN human rights treaties, the ICCPR and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),67
which, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
constitute the International Bill of Rights, obligate states to realize
all of the rights enumerated in these instruments without
discrimination of any kind followed by a non-exhaustive list of
prohibited “grounds.”68
Regional human rights instruments
articulate similar duties.69 These are subordinate norms since a
65

See infra Part IV.
These include, for example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD).
67
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
68
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states,
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 2(1).
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
ICESCR, supra note 67, at art. 2(2).
69
For example, Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” Article 1
of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that “[t]he States
Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination
for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
66
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discrimination claim cannot be made unless the issues in a case are
somehow connected to another right in the treaty.70 Article 26 of
the ICCPR71 and Article 24 of the American Convention on Human
Rights,72 however, are autonomous, standalone provisions which
allow for application beyond the particular rights in the treaties
themselves.73
Global and regional human rights bodies have clarified that
states must ensure substantive, as well as formal, equality. They
have elaborated on the elements of a substantive equality doctrine
and the legal tools mentioned above in a number of ways.
For example, according to the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the list of protected categories (race, sex, etc.)
is illustrative, non-exhaustive, and should be broadly construed.74
national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
ACHR, supra note 57, at art. 14.
70
The European Court of Human Rights explains:
As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 complements the other substantive
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since
it has effect solely in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms’
safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not
presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there
can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one
or more of the latter.
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30141/04 (2010) at ¶ 89.
71
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 26.
72
“All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without
discrimination, to equal protection of the law.” ACHR, supra note 57, at art. 24.
73
See F. H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Views, Human Rights Comm., 10th
Sess., No. 182/1984, ¶ 12.3, U.N. Doc. No. A/42/40 (July 23, 1985) (stating that “[Article]
26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee already provided for in article 2 but provides
in itself an autonomous right. It prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field
regulated and protected by public authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned with the
obligations imposed on States parties in regard to their legislation and the application
thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the
requirement of article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the
application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 is not limited to
those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.”).
74
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains:
The inclusion of ‘other status’ indicates that this list is not exhaustive and other
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Although sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly
included, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the European Court of
Human Rights have read these characteristics into other grounds
such as “sex”75 and “other status.”76 States must also prohibit
discrimination on multiple or intersectional factors77 and on the
basis of association or perception.78 A formal comparator
evaluation based on one ground—often required in domestic
discrimination law—can ignore the contextual realities of
disadvantage that might be present in a given society. In other
words, “[e]liminating discrimination in practice requires paying
sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical
or persistent prejudice instead of merely comparing the formal
treatment of individuals in similar situations.”79
Two cases involving equivalent facts—Hämäläinen v. Finland80

grounds may be incorporated in this category.” It adds that “[t]he nature of
discrimination varies according to context and evolves over time. A flexible approach
to the ground of “other status” is thus needed in order to capture other forms of
differential treatment that cannot be reasonably and objectively justified and are of a
comparable nature to the expressly recognized grounds in article 2, paragraph 2.
These additional grounds are commonly recognized when they reflect the experience
of social groups that are vulnerable and have suffered and continue to suffer
marginalization.
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, 42nd Sess., General Comment 20: NonDiscrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2), at ¶¶ 15, 27, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (May 25, 2009) [hereinafter General Comment 20].
75
See Toonen v. Australia, supra note 46.
76
See, e.g., General Comment 20, supra note 74 (stating that “‘[o]ther status’ as
recognized in article 2, paragraph 2, includes sexual orientation … In addition, gender
identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination.”). The
Committee cited its previous General Comments (14 and 15) as well as the Yogyakarta
Principles.
77
“Some individuals or groups of individuals face discrimination on more than one
of the prohibited grounds, for example women belonging to an ethnic or religious minority.
Such cumulative discrimination has a unique and specific impact on individuals and merits
particular consideration and remedying.” Id. at ¶ 17.
78
“Membership also includes association with a group characterized by one of the
prohibited grounds (e.g. the parent of a child with a disability) or perception by others that
an individual is part of such a group (e.g. a person has a similar skin colour or is a supporter
of the rights of a particular group or a past member of a group).” Id. at ¶ 16.
79
Id. at ¶ 8.
80
Hämäläinen v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37359/09 (2014).
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(decided by the ECHR) and G v. Australia81 (decided by the Human
Rights Committee) —illustrate how formal or substantive
comparator analyses can produce different outcomes. In both cases,
the applicants challenged a requirement that transgender persons be
unmarried in order to obtain official gender recognition in their
acquired gender.
In Hämäläinen v. Finland, the ECHR held that there had been
no breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (privacy and family life) taken in conjunction with Article
14 (non-discrimination) since, in the Court’s view, a transgender
person was not similarly situated to a cissexual person.82 This
identification of a comparator based on a single characteristic—in
this case a cissexual woman—in order to prove differential
treatment is bluntly formal.83 The dissenting judges in the case
made this point when observing that:
The difficult question … concerns the identification of the group
to which the applicant and her spouse can be compared. The
applicant argues that she has been treated differently vis-à-vis
cissexuals, with regard to the refusal to issue her with a new
identity card, and also vis-à-vis heterosexuals, with regard to the
protection of her marriage to a heterosexual spouse. We regret
that the majority rejects these issues simply on the ground that the
applicant’s situation is not similar enough to that of cissexuals
…84
… we are not convinced that the applicant has not been subjected
to discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in
conjunction with Article 8 and consider that the Court’s examination
should have gone into more depth in this regard.85

In 2017, the Human Rights Committee, on the other hand, held
that requiring a transgender woman to divorce before changing her
81

G v. Australia, supra note 55.
See Hämäläinen v. Finland, at ¶¶ 111–12.
83
See Peter Dunne & Dr. Jule Mulder, Beyond the Binary: Towards a ‘Third’ Sex
Category in Germany?, 19 GER. L.J. 638, 627–48 (2018).
84
Hämäläinen v. Finland, at ¶¶ 18, 19.
85
Id. at ¶ 21.
82
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sex on her birth certificate violated Article 26 of the ICCPR.86 The
Committee interpreted the grounds of discrimination broadly,
recognizing the intersection of marital and transgender status. It
explained that “differential treatment between married and
unmarried persons who have undergone a sex affirmation procedure
and who request to amend their sex on their birth certificate is not
based on reasonable and objective criteria, and therefore constitutes
discrimination …”87 The Committee essentially accepted her
contention that she had not been granted equal protection
“compared with a non-transgender woman or compared with an
unmarried transgender woman.” She had, therefore, faced
discrimination “on the basis of her marital status, her transgender
identity and/or a combination of both. Both fall within the concept
of ‘other status’ in article 26.”88
Commentators have pointed out that an overly narrow notion of
identity, according to a formal, “grounds-based” methodology,
could reinforce socially constructed identities and create
assimilationist tendencies.89 This critique, however, does not take
into account the more recent elaborations of a substantive,
intersectional theory. Traditional non-discrimination examinations
have indeed emphasized single characteristics—being gay, lesbian,
or transgender—and require comparisons with others who are not
members of the same group, but who are otherwise similarly
situated. This is often problematic, especially when a comparator
is not evident. Substantive equality’s attention to the complexity of
identity by addressing discrimination on more than one ground in
combination, however, can mitigate these risks and strengthen the
value of an equality and non-discrimination doctrine.

86

See G v. Australia, supra note 55.
Id. at ¶ 7.15.
88 Id. at ¶ 5.1.2.
89
See FREDMAN, supra note 63, at 11 (explaining the assimilationist tendencies of a
formal “equal treatment” approach to non-discrimination. The need to find a similarly
situated comparator “who does not share the characteristic in question . . . assumes that
individuals can be considered in the abstract apart from their colour, religion [etc.] . . . the
basic premise, namely that there exists a ‘universal individual’ is deeply deceptive. Instead
the apparently abstract comparator is clothed with the attributes of the dominant gender,
culture, religion, ethnicity, or sexuality . . . The result of the assumption of the ‘universal
individual’ is therefore to create powerful conformist pressures.”); see also Lau, supra
note 1, at 29 (discussing debates about identitarianism).
87
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The Human Rights Committee has also clarified that
discrimination encompasses discriminatory effects (indirect
discrimination) as well as purpose.90 It confirmed that equal
treatment is not always required91 and that differential treatment
may not be discriminatory if the “criteria for such differentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose
which is legitimate under the Covenant.”92 Indeed, according to the
Committee, “the principle of equality sometimes requires …
affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions
which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the
Covenant.”93
States must also report on “problems of
discrimination in fact, which may be practiced either by public
authorities, by the community, or by private persons or bodies” as
well as discrimination in law.94
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has
further built on these principles. It confirmed that “[m]erely
addressing formal discrimination will not ensure substantive
equality.” States are therefore obligated to “immediately adopt the
necessary measures to prevent, diminish and eliminate the
conditions and attitudes which cause or perpetuate substantive or de
facto discrimination …”95 The meaning of discrimination includes
both its “direct and indirect forms” and “indirect discrimination
refers to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at face
value, but have a disproportionate impact on the exercise of
Covenant rights as distinguished by prohibited grounds of
discrimination.”96
Like the Human Rights Committee, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also
informed states that eliminating “substantive discrimination” may
require the adoption of “special measures to attenuate or suppress
conditions that perpetuate discrimination” as long as they “represent
reasonable, objective and proportional means to redress de facto
90

HRC, 37th Sess., General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment 18].
91
Id. at ¶ 8.
92
Id. at ¶ 13.
93
Id. at ¶ 10.
94
See id. at ¶ 9.
95
See General Comment 20, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 8–10.
96
Id.
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discrimination.”97
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women,98 has explained that CEDAW also requires substantive
equality.99 Its General Recommendation on special measures states
that “a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not
sufficient.”100 Indeed, “[u]nder certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required.”101 Furthermore,
“[t]he lives of women and men must be considered in a contextual
way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of
opportunities, institutions and systems.”102
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the
monitoring body for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD), has reconceptualized substantive equality
as “inclusive” equality.103 It sets out a four-dimensional framework
embracing “a substantive model of equality and extends and
elaborates on the content of equality.”104 The four elements of the
model include:
(a) a fair redistributive dimension to address socioeconomic
disadvantages; (b) a recognition dimension to combat stigma,
stereotyping, prejudice and violence and to recognize the dignity
of human beings and their intersectionality; (c) a participative
dimension to reaffirm the social nature of people as members of
social groups and the full recognition of humanity through

97

Id. at ¶ 9.
The monitoring body for the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
99
See Comm. on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW Committee], General Recommendation No. 25, Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Temporary
Special Measures), at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.7 (2004), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/General%20recommenda
tion%2025%20(English).pdf [https://perma.cc/KV67-ULAU].
100
Id. at ¶ 8.
101
Id. at ¶ 8.
102
Id. at ¶ 10.
103
See Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 19th Sess., General
Comment No. 6 on Equality and Non-Discrimination, U.N. Doc. No. CRPD/C/GC/6 (Apr.
26, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment No. 6].
104
Id.
98
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inclusion in society; and (d) an accommodating dimension to
make space for difference as a matter of human dignity.105

The Committee further emphasized the significance of dignity
to a substantive equality framework: “[e]quality and nondiscrimination are among the most fundamental principles and
rights of international human rights law. Because they are
interconnected with human dignity, they are the cornerstones of all
human rights.”106
Although here the Committee is interpreting equality in the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in particular,
these principles can be generally applied since they are consistent
with the other treaty bodies’ deliberations and are likely to influence
the right to equality in international law more broadly. Indeed,
human rights bodies have attempted (although not always
successfully) to harmonize standards and avoid fragmentation of
norms across treaties.107 The emphasis on disadvantage, effect,
inclusion, and dignity could be especially helpful for considering
LGBT persons’ experiences of discrimination, which are often not
directly or explicitly based on sexual orientation but involve indirect
discrimination and violations of dignity.108
Once again, the various legal tools that can be utilized to
promote a substantive equality model as articulated in these
materials include: 1) expansion of the grounds of discrimination
including multiple or intersectional discrimination, 2) prohibition of
indirect discrimination, 3) sensitivity to context and impact when
determining the validity of justifications for differential treatment,
105
Id. This reflects Sandra Fredman’s model of substantive equality, see FREDMAN,
supra note 63, at 25–33, which includes four overlapping aims. She refers to these as: (1)
The redistributive dimension (breaking the cycle of disadvantage; (2) The recognition
dimension (respect and dignity); (3) The transformative dimension (accommodating
difference and structural change); and (4) The participative dimension (social inclusion
and political voice). She explains that substantive equality aims “to promote respect for
the equal dignity and worth of all” and that it is “the dimension of equality which speaks
to our basic humanity.” Id. at 19–25, 28.
106
General Comment No. 6, supra note 103, at ¶ 4.
107
See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, at 25, UN Doc
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (explaining the “strong presumption against normative
conflict” in international law).
108
See Lau, supra note 1, at 41.
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and 4) developing the principle of dignity. As noted above, these
tools and the scope of substantive equality arguably enhance its
precedential value when compared with other rights, such as privacy
and family life.109
Part IV first examines the significance of international and
comparative human rights law within the Hong Kong legal system.
It then reflects on how the concept of equality in international law
has influenced the emergence of a substantive equality doctrine in
Hong Kong and judicial approaches to LGBT rights claims.
IV. Substantive Equality and LGBT Rights in Hong Kong
A. Impact of International and Comparative Human Rights
Law
As mentioned above, courts have frequently applied
comparative case law, including international human rights
standards, when reviewing challenges to government policies that
limit fundamental human rights. Hong Kong, a former British
colony, became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997. Hong Kong’s
constitutional document, the Basic Law, grants the SAR a high
degree of autonomy including a separate, common law legal system
and an independent judiciary. The constitutional framework also
incorporates international human rights standards. Article 39
specifies that “[t]he provisions of the [ICCPR], the [ICESCR], and
international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall
remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the
Hong Kong [SAR].”110 The ICCPR’s continued application to Hong
Kong since 1997, although the PRC is not a state party, is a notable
element of Hong Kong’s autonomy.111 Hong Kong reports on its
own to the Human Rights Committee which then issues Concluding
Comments for the Hong Kong and Macau SARs only.
The Bill of Rights Ordinance,112 a statute adopted in 1991,113

109

See id.; Frances Hamilton, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage Before the European
Court of Human Rights, 65 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 1582, 1586 (2018).
110
Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 15, at art. 39.
111
Id. at art 2.
112
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 383, (L.H.K.).
113
See Richard Swede, One Territory: Three Systems? The Hong Kong Bill of Rights,
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essentially duplicates the text of the ICCPR and has now achieved
constitutional status. As a result, despite Hong Kong’s dualist,
common law legal system which does not permit the courts to rely
directly on international treaties unless they have been incorporated
into domestic law, the courts have frequently cited materials
produced by international and comparative judicial and quasijudicial institutions. The Basic Law explicitly allows the courts to
“refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions.”114
Judgments rendered by the Privy Council, the UK House of Lords,
and now the UK Supreme Court, have been particularly
influential.115
After the enactment of the Bill of Rights and even before the
change of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong courts began referencing
international and comparative human rights jurisprudence. In one
of the earliest of these cases, R v. Sin Yau-ming,116 concerning the
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the Court of
Appeal pointed out that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, Hong
Kong courts could derive guidance from other common law
jurisdictions with a “constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights” and
“decisions of the European Court of Human Rights” and
international human rights monitoring bodies, especially the Human
Rights Committee.117 While submitting that these materials are not
strictly binding, they are “of the greatest assistance” and the Court
would “give to them considerable weight … in so far as they reflect
the interpretation of articles in the Covenant and are directly related
to Hong Kong legislation.”118 The Court also explained that “the
glass through which we view the interpretation of the Hong Kong
Bill [of Rights] is a glass provided by the [ICCPR].”119 The Court
of Appeal confirmed the importance of comparative and

44 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 358, 359 (1995) (“[T]he Bill of Rights was adopted in 1991 in a
response to fears in Hong Kong about the looming return to Chinese sovereignty,
especially after the Chinese government’s massacre of unarmed civilians in Beijing on 4
June 1989 ending the peaceful democracy protests in Tiananmen Square.”).
114
Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 15, at art 84.
115
See Young, supra note 16.
116
R v. Sin Yau-ming, [1992] 1 H.K.L.R. 127 (C.A.) (H.K.).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
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international human rights jurisprudence in R v. Man Wai-keung
(No 2) (Man Wai-keung),120 a case about the right to equality before
the courts and tribunals, and set out a test that has since provided
the basis for the development of the equality doctrine discussed
below.
Hong Kong courts are cognizant of their own contribution to a
growing transnational judicial conversation about the meaning of
constitutional rights.121 In QT v. Director of Immigration, a case
concerning the denial of a dependent visa to the same-sex partner of
a foreign resident working in Hong Kong, the Court of Final Appeal
observed that “[t]here has been a notable convergence in the
approaches of various courts, including our own, to what constitutes
discrimination, influenced by international human rights
instruments.”122 It then stated that “[t]he jurisprudence of the
[ECHR] and its interaction with the jurisprudence of the House of
Lords, the Privy Council and the United Kingdom Supreme Court
relating to the Human Rights Act 1998 and domestic antidiscrimination legislation are of particular relevance in the present
case.”123
B.

Substantive Equality
This section traces the growth of a constitutional equality

120
The Queen v. Man Wai-keung, [1992] 2 H.K.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.) (H.K.) (“It was
held in R v. Sin Yau-Ming . . . that in interpreting the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, this Court
can be guided by decisions of supra-national tribunals such as the European Court of
Human Rights, and that even greater assistance can be derived from decisions of the
domestic courts in jurisdictions, such as the United States of America and Canada, which
have constitutionally entrenched Bills of Rights. It was held also, that although the Hong
Kong Bill did not contain a ‘justification’ provision similar to s. 1 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights . . . such a provision is to be implied. Finally, in addressing a challenge to a
statutory provision on the ground of inconsistency with the Bills of Rights, the court in Sin
Yau-Ming applied the rationality test and the proportionality test.”).
121
See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO.
L.J. 487 (2005); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?:
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J.L. STUD.
499, 516–29 (2000); Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue,
Internationalisation of Law and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 171 (2008).
122
See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324, at ¶ 30 (C.F.A.)
(H.K.).
123
Id.
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doctrine in LGBT rights cases in Hong Kong since 2006. It draws
on the insights about equality in international human rights law in
Part III to explore the courts’ application of legal tools that
strengthen a substantive model. It concludes that these decisions
have led to the elaboration of a fairly robust, if not quite explicit,
substantive equality doctrine that could have significant
implications for LGBT rights claims going forward, including
same-sex marriage as considered in Part V.
1.

Prohibited grounds of discrimination

As discussed above, an adaptable theory that recognizes
disadvantage based on context as well as complexity when
identifying the prohibited grounds of discrimination is an element
of a substantive equality doctrine. The courts have broadly
interpreted the lack of explicit grounds in Article 25 of the Basic
Law, which simply states: “[a]ll Hong Kong residents shall be equal
before the law,” and the non-exhaustive list in Articles 1 and 22 of
the Bill of Rights, which duplicate Articles 2(1) and 26 of the
ICCPR. When determining which “grounds” are invidious, they
have relied on comparative human rights jurisprudence.
For example, in Leung v. Secretary for Justice,124 a case
challenging different ages of consent for “buggery” and
heterosexual intercourse as elaborated below, the Court of First
Instance cited the Human Rights Committee’s views in Toonen v.
Australia.125 This was one of the first times a Hong Kong court
recognized that sexual orientation is a constitutionally prohibited
ground of discrimination. The Court also cited “a series of
judgments of the [ECHR]” in support.126 In the same case on appeal,
the Court of Appeal noted the government “accepted that
homosexuality was a status for the purposes of Articles 1 and 22 of
the Bill of Rights.”127 When invalidating the directly discriminatory
offence of “homosexual buggery committed otherwise than in
private” in Secretary for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, the Court of Final
Appeal also confirmed that “[d]iscrimination on the ground of
124

See Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 657 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
Id. at ¶ 45; see also Toonen v. Australia, supra note 46.
126
See Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at ¶ 46.
127
Id.
125
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sexual orientation would plainly be unconstitutional” and “sexual
orientation is within the phrase ‘other status’” in the equality
provisions in the Bill of Rights and the ICCPR.128
In these cases, the courts were inclusive, interpreting new,
implicit, proscribed characteristics into the ICCPR’s nonexhaustive list, in line with the human rights treaty bodies’
jurisprudence considered above. While Hong Kong courts have not
yet overtly acknowledged intersectional discrimination, their
approaches to indirect discrimination and fluid discussion of marital
status and sexual orientation in QT v. Director of Immigration
(examined below) suggest a degree of openness to this aspect of
substantive equality.
2.

Meaning of discrimination

Another key feature of Hong Kong’s substantive equality
doctrine is the acknowledgement that differential treatment is not
necessarily the same as discrimination. In Man-wai Keung, the
Court of Appeal distinguished between “a discrimination, as
opposed to a distinction.”129 It added that “given the nature of the
[Bill of Rights] … [o]ne must look to the interests of society and to
all the circumstances which the legislature had in mind when
creating what the courts find to be a distinction amounting to a
discrimination.”130 It cited the Human Rights Committee’s General
Comment on non-discrimination to explain that equality “does not
mean identical treatment in every instance … not every
differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the
criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if
the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the
Covenant.”131 This attention to context and the plurality of forms
that discrimination might take has continued to infuse equality
principles, especially in LGBT rights adjudication. In these cases,
substantive equality is reflected in both the courts’ recognition that
indirect discrimination is unconstitutional as well as the nature of
the proportionality test for establishing when differential treatment
is justified.
128

See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, at ¶ 11 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
129
The Queen v. Man Wai-keung, [1992] 2 H.K.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.) (H.K.).
130
Id.
131
Id. at ¶ 33; see also General Comment 18, supra note 90, at ¶ 8.
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effects

and

indirect

discrimination
If differential treatment is not always discrimination, it follows
that facially neutral measures might amount to discrimination under
certain circumstances. In other words, both direct and indirect
discrimination are unconstitutional. This can be helpful when
addressing LGBT rights claims, which frequently concern
discriminatory effects, but where facial classifications based on
sexual orientation or gender identity may not be clearly drawn.
In Leung v. Secretary for Justice,132 the applicant, a gay man
who was under the age of 21, challenged the constitutionality of
criminal provisions setting out different ages of consent for
homosexual “buggery”133 and sexual intercourse between a man and
a woman.134 The Court of Appeal explained that this was not formal
“direct” discrimination because the age of consent for “buggery”
between a male and female was also 21. Instead it held that the
difference constituted “disguised” discrimination in contravention
of the right to equality in the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights. This
was the first time a Hong Kong court determined that indirect
discrimination is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal agreed with
the first instance decision that “[d]enying persons of a minority class
the right to sexual expression in the only way available to them,
even if that way is denied to all, remains discriminatory when
persons of a majority class are permitted the right to sexual
expression in a way natural to them.”135
The courts have confirmed this approach in subsequent cases.
For example, in Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil
Service, the courts contemplated whether Mr. Leung, a civil servant
who entered into a same-sex marriage abroad, is entitled to the same
benefits and allowances that the Government provides to the
“spouses” of other civil servants married to persons of the opposite
132

Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, 3 H.K.L.R.D.
Id.
134
See Crimes Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 200, § 118(C) (H.K.) (“[A] man who – (a)
commits buggery with a man under the age of 21; or (b) being under the age of 21 commits
buggery with another man, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction
on indictment to imprisonment for life.”).
135
Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at ¶ 48.
133
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gender. The Court of First Instance decided that there was
unjustifiable discrimination, reasoning that “although the
differential treatment is, on the face of the matter, based on the legal
marital status of the officer … it should also be regarded as being
based, indirectly, on sexual orientation.”136 Although the Court of
Appeal reversed this decision, accepting the government’s
justifications, it acknowledged that the differential treatment would
have otherwise amounted to indirect sexual orientation
discrimination.
In QT v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal (and
the lower courts) similarly confirmed that indirect discrimination is
unlawful. In this case a lesbian expatriate couple claimed the
immigration policy denying a dependent visa to the same-sex
partner of a sponsor who had been admitted to Hong Kong to take
up employment discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.137
A different-sex spouse could have applied to join him/her for
residence.138 At issue was “whether the policy constitutes
discrimination based on sexual orientation … because of the
differential treatment concerning eligibility by reason of marital
status.”139
The Court explained that the converging views of various
courts, including the ECHR, on the meaning of discrimination
includes general recognition that adverse treatment amounting to
discrimination can take three forms. The first two: “‘[l]ike cases
should be treated alike, unlike cases should not be treated alike’”140
136

See Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2018] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 84, ¶
53 (C.A.) (H.K.).
137
See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324, ¶ 29 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
138
Id. at ¶ 142.
139
Id. at ¶ 41. In QT v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal held it was
not necessary to directly determine the constitutionality of the denial of a dependent visa
for a same-sex spouse. Instead, it applied the weaker administrative law test of Wednesbury
unreasonableness and found there was no reasonable connection between the policy and
the aims it was trying to achieve. It therefore found no need to apply a stricter
proportionality test. The court explained that “[QT’s] claim is primarily and sufficiently
framed as one for judicial review on the basis that refusing her a dependent visa . . .
amounts to unlawful discrimination which is irrational and unreasonable in a Wednesbury
sense.” Id. at ¶ 102.
140
Id. at ¶ 6 (citing Lord Nicholls, Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, ¶ 9
and Li CJ, Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, ¶ 19 (C.F.A.) (H.K.)).
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represent a formal articulation. The third “involves indirect
discrimination where the measure complained of appears neutral on
its face but is significantly prejudicial to the complainant in its
effect.”141
The Court of Final Appeal agreed with the Court of Appeal’s
logic: “[s]ince all unmarried couples, heterosexual or homosexual,
are similarly excluded, the Director has not singled out same-sex
couples for differential treatment.”142 The policy nevertheless
indirectly discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation because
“a heterosexual unmarried couple may make themselves eligible by
getting married if they so wish. But a homosexual unmarried couple
cannot do so because they cannot marry in the sense as understood
according to the law of Hong Kong.”143 This element of choice, or
lack thereof, is noteworthy and may factor into the courts’ review
of upcoming cases concerning same-sex marriage and civil
partnerships.144
b)

Test for justification of differential

treatment
The proportionality test developed by the courts for determining
when differential treatment is justified and when it amounts to
unconstitutional discrimination also contains features of substantive
equality. The Court of Appeal suggested such a test in Man-wai
Keung, explaining that since “distinctions can be lawful” and
“discrimination may amount to an unlawful distinction,” it is
necessary to “look to the rationality, the reasonableness and the
proportionality of the distinction or discrimination.”145
The Court of Final Appeal expounded on this test146 in Secretary
141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see infra Part V discussion about how
Hong Kong should be distinguished from the European context since Hong Kong does not
provide any options at all for legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
145
The Queen v. Man Wai-keung, [1992] 2 H.K.C.L.R. 207, ¶ 33 (C.A.) (H.K.).
146
The test has three parts and requires: (1) The difference in treatment must pursue
a legitimate aim. For any aim to be legitimate, a genuine need for such difference must be
established. (2) The difference in treatment must be rationally connected to the legitimate
142
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for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung.147 Again, consistent with Man-wai
Keung and the Human Rights Committee’s position, the Chief
Justice explained that if a distinction can be justified then it was not
discriminatory in the first place. In this way, he distinguished
between the justification test for equality and that used for other
constitutionally-protected rights:
In requiring differential treatment to be justified, the view has been
expressed that the difference in treatment in question is an
infringement of the constitutional right to equality but that the
infringement may be constitutionally justified. This approach is not
appropriate.
Where the difference in treatment satisfies the
justification test, the correct approach is to regard the difference in
treatment as not constituting discrimination and not infringing the
constitutional right to equality. Unlike some other constitutional
rights, such as the right of peaceful assembly, it is not a question of
infringement of the right which may be constitutionally justified.148

This observation contains the seeds of a substantive equality
doctrine.
Since differential treatment aimed at addressing
disadvantage would be consistent with, and not a prima facie breach
of, the constitutional equality guarantee, special measures, or other
remedies in cases involving de facto discrimination, might be
necessary, proportionate distinctions and therefore valid. Such a
determination goes beyond formal equal treatment. It requires
attention to the real impact, disadvantage, and detriment
experienced by members of marginalized groups. The Court’s
explanation suggests that the right to equality and nondiscrimination has an absolute nature: unjustifiable distinctions
(direct or indirect) are always discriminatory and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
In other words, a deviation from equal treatment that is justified

aim. (3) The difference in treatment must be no more than is necessary to accomplish the
legitimate aim.” Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, ¶ 20 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
147
Li CJ also explained … that “[e]quality is the antithesis of discrimination. The
constitutional right to equality is in essence the right not to be discriminated against. It
guarantees protection from discrimination.” He also links the constitutional framework in
Hong Kong to the global context, and explicitly mentions the ICCPR. Id. at ¶ 1.
148
Id. at ¶ 22 (emphasis added).
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is not an “exception” to equality but may be part of the substantive
equality duty. While the Court’s reasoning may not affect the actual
outcomes of many discrimination cases in practice (formal equality
may still achieve the same results), its substantive language
nevertheless strengthens equality’s potential. A substantive doctrine
in Hong Kong constitutional law—infused by international human
rights law—could support a range of discrimination claims beyond
LGBT rights issues.
The Court of Final Appeal’s confirmation in QT v. Director
of Immigration149 that the proportionality test would be applied
more stringently in cases involving a marginalized group is also
significant. “The court will subject the impugned measure to
‘particularly severe scrutiny’” in cases “where a person is subjected
to differential treatment on any of the suspect grounds, including
sexual orientation” which narrows “the government’s margin of
discretion.”150 It added, citing ECHR jurisprudence, “[t]hat does not
mean that the measure can never pass muster, but it will require the
government to provide ‘very weighty reasons’ or ‘particularly
convincing and weighty reasons’ to justify the challenged difference
in treatment, applying the standard of reasonable necessity.”151
3.

Dignity

As discussed above, dignity is a hallmark of substantive
equality. This principle is repeated often, alongside equality, and
placed in a prominent position in human rights treaties and many
national constitutions. Cases involving discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, including some in
Hong Kong, regularly refer to dignity.152 Although Hong Kong
courts tend to mention dignity in a somewhat perfunctory manner
149
In the end, the court did not actually need to consider the constitutionality of the
discriminatory treatment but nevertheless held in favor of the same-sex couple by applying
a weaker rational connection test. See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R.
324, ¶ 29 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
150
Id. at ¶ 108.
151
Id.
152
See Michele Finck, The Role of Human Dignity in Gay Rights Adjudication and
Legislation: A Comparative Perspective, 14 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 26–53 (2016) (noting
that dignity has increasingly played a key role in the “evolution of gay rights,” especially
cases concerning marriage equality).
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and without elaboration, such judicial acknowledgement
nevertheless signals an apparent appreciation of substantive
equality and its relevance to the LGBT context. It also sets the
groundwork for fuller development of the scope and parameters of
dignity as a nascent constitutional principle.
For example, in QT v. Director of Immigration, the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal commented, “[i]t hardly needs to be pointed
out that unlawful discrimination is fundamentally unacceptable.”153
In support it cited Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe’s use of dignity to
evoke substantive equality in R (Carson) v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions.154 He writes that “[i]n the field of human rights,
discrimination is regarded as particularly objectionable because it
disregards fundamental notions of human dignity and equality
before the law.”155 He adds that discrimination is demeaning
because it treats a person unfavorably on the grounds of sexual or
racial stereotypes rather than on the basis of merit.156
The QT v. Director of Immigration judgment also cites a
reference to dignity by the Canadian Supreme Court in Law v.
Canada,157 generally considered one of Canada’s landmark
substantive equality cases.158 In that decision, Justice Iacobucci
explains that “[h]uman dignity is harmed by unfair treatment
premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate
to individual needs, capacities, or merits.”159 He also clarifies that
the constitutional equality guarantee in Canada includes substantive
equality.160
153

See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 27.
R (Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 173, ¶ 49
(UKHL).
155
Id.
156
See id.
157
See QT v. Director of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 107 n.137 (quoting Law
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.R. 497 (Can.)).
158
Patricia Hughes, Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational
Constitutional Principle, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 5, 23 (1999).
159
See QT v. Director of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 107 n.137 (quoting Law
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.R. 497 (Can.)).
160
In Law v. Canada, the judge explained:
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth.
It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human
dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or
circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is
154
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V. Prospects for Same-sex Relationship Recognition in Hong
Kong
This section contemplates prospects for judicial recognition of
same-sex marriage in Hong Kong with reference to this emerging
substantive equality doctrine in Hong Kong constitutional law.161
Although to date Hong Kong courts have not yet deliberated on the
issue of a constitutional right to legal recognition of same-sex
relationships, they have occasionally emphasized, in obiter, its
absence from Hong Kong law. For example, and most recently, in
QT v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal reiterated
that “[m]arriage in [Hong Kong] is … heterosexual and
monogamous. By definition, it is not a status open to couples of the
same sex, the right to marriage in Hong Kong does not make
marriage available to same-sex couples.”162 It also noted that the
“the European Convention on Human Rights does not impose
obligations on states to grant same-sex couples the right to marry.”163
This remark and the courts’ predilection to rely on the ECHR
jurisprudence could foreshadow possible approaches to the
enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different
individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. Human
dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or
devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and
groups within Canadian society. Human dignity within the meaning of the equality
guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se,
but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted
with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all
of the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), S.C.R. at ¶ 53; see also
Sophia Moreau, Promise of Law v. Canada, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 415 (2007) (reflecting on
the value of dignity as considered in Law v. Canada).
161
For an earlier discussion of this issue focusing on the right to marriage in the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR, see Michael Ramsden & Luke Marsh, Same-Sex
Marriage in Hong Kong: The Case for a Constitutional Right, 19 THE INT’L J. OF HUM.
RTS. 90, 90–103 (2015).
162
See QT v. Director of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 25.
163
Id.; see Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30141/04 (2010);
Hämäläinen v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37359/09 (2014); Chapin and Charpentier
v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 40183/07 (2016).
In W v. Registrar of Marriages, the court granted a post-operative transgender
woman the right to marry her male partner in her acquired gender, the Court of Final
Appeal clarified that “nothing in this judgment is intended to address the question of same
sex marriage.” W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 90, ¶ 2 (C.A.) (H.K.).
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upcoming same-sex marriage challenge.164 This Part therefore
reflects on whether the positions of the ECHR and the Human
Rights Committee—as expressed in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria and
Joslin v. New Zealand—are appropriate for application in Hong
Kong. Can they be distinguished? What should the courts bear in
mind when evaluating their persuasive value?
Although a number of domestic courts have ruled in favor of
marriage for same-sex couples, as mentioned above only one
international human rights body, the IACHR, has identified a right
to same-sex marriage.165 In 2002, the Human Rights Committee
decided that the New Zealand Marriage Act, which defined
marriage as between a man and a woman, did not breach the right
to marriage in ICCPR Article 23.166 In a terse eight-sentence
consideration of the merits, the Committee noted that the reference
to “men and women” of marriageable age “rather than the general
terms used elsewhere in … the Covenant, has been consistently and
uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation … is
to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a
woman wishing to marry each other.”167 It then refrained from
analyzing the discrimination claim, or any of the other rights that
had been invoked by the applicant. As discussed below, this stark
avoidance of equality may have been an attempt to side-step
controversy and threats to the legitimacy of the UN treaty body
process.
In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,168 the ECHR held that denial of
marriage to a same-sex couple was consistent with Article 8 (family
life) and Article 12 (marriage), read in conjunction with Article 14
(non-discrimination) of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Although the Court adopted an inclusive understanding of
family life, extending its meaning to same-sex relationships for the
first time,169 it also avoided a fuller examination of the
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discrimination issue. It relied largely on what it believed to be a
lack of consensus among member states of the Council of Europe
and applied a wide margin of appreciation.170
A reconsideration of these decisions appears probable, however,
for a number of reasons. First, global trends are shifting largely in
favor of same-sex marriage. This could be especially influential for
the ECHR’s position given its emphasis on consensus when
determining the appropriate scope of the margin of appreciation.
Their mention of the building of a consensus in Europe, a “tendency
[that] has developed rapidly over the past decade” suggests
possibilities.171 There was also notable division among the judges
with three of seven dissenting.172
The Court also acknowledged the strength of equality and nondiscrimination since serious reasons are necessary to justify
differential treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation. Falling
back on the margin of appreciation doctrine, however, may have
been a convenient way to avoid the controversy that a positive
ruling based on equality may have generated.173 Paradoxically, by
avoiding equality, the Court actually seemed to be signaling its
appreciation of equality’s potential. Indeed, had it utilized a
stringent proportionality test to evaluate the validity of differential
treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples with regard
to marriage, the Court may have come to a different conclusion. It

of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.” Id. at ¶ 94.
170
The Court explained that “[t]he scope of the margin of appreciation will vary
according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background; in this respect, one
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the laws of the Contracting States.” Despite recognizing an “emerging European consensus
towards legal recognition of same-sex couples” the Court held that “[n]evertheless, there
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by The Human Rights Committee, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (2016) (discussing the margin
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would have likely been difficult to accept the reasons put forward
for justifying the differential treatment—the denial of marriage—
had it reflected on the requirements of substantive equality. As
discussed above, it would have needed to take an expansive
approach to the prohibited grounds, provide a nuanced
interpretation of the meaning of discrimination, pay attention to
impact, and appreciate the stigma (dignity harms), and exclusion
that same-sex couples experience when denied access to the
institution of marriage.
Some have suggested that the Human Rights Committee might
also arrive at a different view if asked to reevaluate its position on
same-sex marriage. For example, Gerber, Tay, and Sifris argue that
Joslin v. New Zealand is no longer “good law” in light of
international legal developments since 2002 and human rights treaty
bodies’ acceptance that core human rights treaties are “living
instruments.”174 They maintain that the Human Rights Committee’s
reading was overly narrow and not in line with the rules of treaty
interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.175
In 2013, Sarah Joseph observed that Joslin v. New Zealand had been
deliberated nearly a decade earlier and predicted that “it is only a
matter of time before the topic of same-sex marriage returns to the
[Human Rights Committee]” and expected “a global tipping point
to be reached, where the [Committee] will decide a similar case
differently.”176 Indeed, if it applied its substantive equality doctrine,
the Committee would likely have difficulty justifying the direct or
indirect harms arising from the denial of marriage.
In two recent cases involving relationship rights, the Hong Kong
Court of Appeal avoided a substantive equality analysis and its
implications. For example, although holding in favor of the
applicant in QT v. Director of Immigration,177 the Court of Appeal
introduced a categorization of “core rights” associated with
marriage that could be shielded from judicial review.178 These core
174
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rights would be immune from challenge even when direct or indirect
differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation is involved.
The Court explained that:
There are certainly areas of life which are, whether by nature or by
tradition or long usage, closely connected with marriage such that
married couples should and do enjoy rights and shoulder obligations
which are unique to them as married people. The rights and
obligations in these areas of life which go with the status of marriage
must be regarded as core rights and obligations unique to a
relationship of marriage, so much so that the entailing privileged
treatments to married couples as compared with unmarried couples
(including same sex couples) should simply be considered as
treatments that require no justification because the difference in
position between the married and the unmarried is self-obvious.179

This somewhat awkward device appears designed to allow the
courts some flexibility to circumvent a robust justification test—
already available in the context of LGBT discrimination claims—in
cases involving same-sex relationship rights. Indeed, the Court of
Appeal affirmed in Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil
Service180 that the “concept of core rights and obligations … was
precisely an attempt to protect and ring fence the institution and
status of marriage that is heterosexual marriage in Hong Kong.”181
Like the ECHR and the Human Rights Committee, the Hong
Kong court may be indirectly—and paradoxically—signaling its
acknowledgment of the potential of the constitutional equality
doctrine. As in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria and Joslin v. New
Zealand, if the court needs to apply a stringent equality review to a
same-sex marriage claim, it is difficult to imagine that the
government’s justifications—even to preserve the traditional
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concept of marriage—could be “weighty” enough.182 A dignity
principle could also at the same time unveil the underlying stigma
associated with this type of argument; an exclusionary reason for
denying marriage based on prejudice would surely fall foul of
substantive or “inclusive” equality as discussed in Part III above.
The Court of Final Appeal in QT v. Director of Immigration rejected
the lower court’s attempt to ring fence marriage rights, however,183
and has therefore reopened possibilities for a stronger review of
relationship policies based on substantive equality.
The Hong Kong challenges can also be distinguished from
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria for a number of additional reasons. First,
at the time of the decision, Austria had recently introduced
registered partnerships for same-sex couples, which gave the
applicants an alternative for recognition of their relationship short
of marriage. The ECHR noted that “[g]iven that at present it is open
to the applicants to enter into a registered partnership, the Court is
not called upon to examine whether the lack of any means of legal
recognition for same-sex couples would constitute a violation … if
it still obtained today.”184 If neither marriage nor registered
partnerships had been available, the Court may well have come to a
different conclusion. In Hong Kong, however, there are no options
for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships on the basis of
equality with different sex couples. The absence of choice for
same-sex couples could be a determinative factor in the upcoming
judicial reviews.185
Furthermore, the European Court’s concern with consensus,
which was the primary reason for its decision against same-sex
marriage, is not appropriate in a domestic jurisdiction like Hong
Kong.186 Hong Kong does not face the same demands as an
182
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international organization made up of diverse member states. Some
have suggested that the European Court of Human Rights relied on
consensus and a wide-margin of appreciation in order to avoid
controversy and protect the Court’s legitimacy in a divided Council
of Europe.187 Similarly, Langford contends that the Human Rights
Committee in Joslin may have been trying to prevent a backlash at
a time when a minority of states parties to the ICCPR had ratified
the Optional Protocol allowing individual communications and
shortly before two had denounced it.188
There may be fewer apprehensions in Hong Kong about how
rulings involving LGBT rights could affect the legitimacy of
judicial institutions. To be sure, Hong Kong’s constitutional status
as an autonomous entity within an authoritarian state poses unique
challenges, and some have noted worrying signs that judicial
independence is under threat.189 LGBT rights, however, do not
engage particularly sensitive political issues concerning Hong
Kong’s relationship with Mainland China. In a study measuring the
Hong Kong courts’ degree of deference to the government when
adjudicating human rights cases, Chan found that the courts have
been less deferential when the right to equality of a vulnerable
minority group is at stake.190 She also discovered (contrary to her
initial hypothesis) that they have also been less deferential in cases
Registrar of Marriages, 41 H.K. L.J. 75 (2011).
187
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188
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involving “moral controversy.”191
Despite the strong equality arguments for same-sex marriage
and reasons to distinguish the Hong Kong situation, courts may
nevertheless uncritically follow the current position of the ECHR
and the Human Rights Committee (however incorrectly reasoned
and susceptible to a reversal). Acceptance of a right to some form
of civil partnership has a better chance of success, however, and the
ECHR’s jurisprudence would more readily reinforce such an
outcome.192 Rapidly changing attitudes in Hong Kong and majority
public support for same-sex couple rights generally, including
marriage,193 should mitigate any qualms that the courts might have
about the need for societal consensus. The more robust equality
analysis in the IACHR’s advisory opinion should also resonate in
Hong Kong, given the strength of the SAR’s constitutional rights
framework and acceptance of substantive equality.
VI. Conclusions
This Article contends that a right to substantive equality and
non-discrimination has significant capacity to further LGBT claims
before international bodies and domestic courts. Prospects for the
eventual recognition of same-sex marriage in Hong Kong, or at least
some form of civil partnership that grants rights consistent with
marriage to same-sex couples, likely hinges on developments in
international and comparative human rights law. Whether the UN
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights
revisit their previous positions in Joslin v. New Zealand and Schalk
and Kopf v. Austria could impact the outcome of future cases in
Hong Kong and elsewhere. As examined above these bodies have
arguably not yet fully embraced the implications of the robust
substantive equality doctrine elaborated in their interpretive
materials at least with regard to marriage. This untapped potential
suggests possible legal strategies for Hong Kong and beyond.
If Hong Kong courts do leverage the promise of their
constitutional equality doctrine, they could contribute more
concretely to the global convergence of LGBT rights norms (and
191
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human rights norms generally).
This would not require
inappropriate judicial activism and is unlikely to undermine the
judiciary’s legitimacy or independence. Courts in a number of other
jurisdictions have already relied on substantive equality when
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage even in contexts where
public support was more limited.194 A closer consideration of LGBT
rights jurisprudence in Hong Kong may also contribute to broader
debates about the effectiveness of international human rights law on
domestic implementation and internalization of norms.195 Indeed,
the Hong Kong cases illustrate the potential of international human
rights law for the advancement of LGBT rights in domestic legal
systems where the courts look to comparative experience for
guidance.
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